Abstract
The article aims at a comparative analysis of the Russian military operations in Kyiv, during the current war in Ukraine, and those carried out in Grozny, during the 1st Chechen War, namely from a discursive and operational standpoint, in order to highlight similarities and differences between both cases and clarify the comparisons used during the attempted siege of Kyiv. The analysis shows the existence of several similarities between the Russian invasion of Kyiv and that of Grozny, notwithstanding the end result, namely from the discursive, the Russian armed force’s preparation and planning, the adversary’s response and the invader’s moral standpoints, as well as in the use of heavy artillery, namely against civilian populations. These similarities raise additional questions about the Russian armed force’s loss of quality during the Putin era, following several military successes. Lastly, the use of this comparison served essentially to raise awareness in the public and in international institutions about what could happen in Kyiv (and in the rest of Ukraine) and to emphasise the need for support to Ukraine on the West’s behalf.
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